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Introduction
1 The criticism towards methodological nationalisms is more and more shared in social
sciences, and has boosted the attention on territorialized institutional processes. In this
respect, the approach to the rescaling of statehood (Brenner, 2004) is focal to analyse
territorial changes and related institutional adaptations. 
2 Immigration policy has been more and more studied in its territorial dimension, too:
localized processes and actors are related to complex scalar relations, with place-specific
configurations producing distinct models of integration. Local policies affect migration
and integration processes in relation to scalar factors such as the positioning of different
locales in urban and regional hierarchies and the transformations of local economy (Glick
Schiller,  Caglar,  2010). The  localized  regulation  of  policies  (including  education  and
immigration) may reinforce selective, exclusionary and othering practices detrimental to
vulnerable groups, such as international migrants.
3 Starting from this perspective,  this article analyses school segregation of Pupils from
Immigrant  Backgrounds  (from here  on,  PIBs)1 and  policies  targeting  them in  Italian
schools. This policy area is a privileged observation deck of the territorial dimension of
migration policy,  where settlement patterns and institutional  coping meet.  Analysing
school  segregation  means  focussing  on  the  relationship  between  minorities  and  an
important State agency of socialization – with the local dimension playing a focal role due
to the devolution of educational organizations and the effects educational agencies have
on restructuring local communities (as welfare institutions coping with social needs, and
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as  producers  of  inputs  for  local  labour  markets,  see  Lipman,  2010).  The  scalar
configuration will be disentangled by analysing the relationship between local economies
and settlement patterns, that intermingle with national and regional regulation patterns
in defining risks of school segregation.
4 The focus will be on four metropolitan areas, chosen according to their size, relevance as
migration hubs (Pugliese, 2008), diversity of local welfare and position in national and
international urban hierarchies – framing factors in the constraints and opportunities of
managing migration. We analysed the two largest Italian metropolitan areas, Milan and
Rome, plus a well-off Northern Italian city with a comparatively generous and structured
municipal welfare, and a Mediterranean city that is the largest migration hub in Southern
Italy and has a residual local welfare (Kazepov, Barberis, 2012). 
5 As for their economic position, Bologna and Milan are regional manufacturing centres,
even though Milan itself  and Rome are also national and international  service hubs.
Finally, Naples is a smaller labour market with a strong tertiary vocation, but also a non
negligible secondary sector. 
6 Metropolitan  size  and  labour  markets  influence  migration  settlement  and  PIBs’
characteristics: service economies in Milan and Rome attract a number of immigrants in
the core city, though in affordable peripheral areas; the mix of service and industrial
sprawl  in  Bologna  and  Naples  favours  a  dispersal  in  the  larger  metropolitan  area.
Immigrant families with children follow similar paths, with quite a concentration of PIBs
in (often disadvantaged) suburban areas.
7 This article is based on research activities that took place within the framework of two
projects: (a) a project of national interest (PRIN 2006) on the local dimension of social
policy; (b) a FP7-funded project on the Governance of Educational Trajectories in Europe (
GOETE). Within the first one, a research campaign on local immigrant policies has been
conducted (years 2007-2010), with a collection of local policy documents (retrieved from
welfare plans produced by the Regions); interviews with local policy makers (n = 20, 5 per
city); interviews based on the vignette technique, i.e. a simulation of case histories to be
discussed with street-level bureaucrats (mostly social workers, n = 40 – between 8 and 12
per Region); the construction of a dataset on schools and students that based the analysis
of segregation. Within the second one (years 2010-2012), a document analysis (this time at
national  level)  and  interviews  to  national  and  local  policy  makers  and  educational
professionals (n = 15 – 6 at national level,  2 in Milan, 5 in Bologna, 2 in Rome) were
conducted.
8 The argument will be deployed by contextualizing first the main features of the Italian
education system and the role of PIBs in it. As a second step, we will explore regional
policies targeting migrant youth, and lastly, the main features of school segregation will
be analysed. Conclusions will wrap up different parts of the argument.
 
Setting the stage: the Italian education system, its
governance and the position of PIBs
Main features
9 Italy has a comprehensive (i.e. formally not selecting intakes according to skills or social
conditions) education system since 1962. The Ministry of Education governed this system
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in  a  bureaucratic-hierarchical  way,  despite  a  well-known  and  long-lasting  territorial
cleavage  (Grimaldi,  Serpieri,  2012).  Centralism  has  been  eroded  by  waves  of
decentralization,  in  the  1970s  (regionalization  of  vocational  training;  definition  of
representative  bodies  in  schools),  and  during  the  1990s-2000s  (increased  school
autonomy: managerial role of the principal; definition of curricula, extra-school services
and  organization  of  teaching  activities).  Decentralization  climaxed  with  the
constitutional  reform  in  2001,  which  expanded  the  financial  and  legislative  role  of
Regions, also in the field of education and training. Regions and local authorities are also
responsible for the establishment and location of schools in their territory, and for public
transport of pupils, thus defining some policy conditions for segregation.2
10 Compulsory  education  is  organized  in  two  cycles:  the first  one  includes  two  tiers
providing general education – primary (ISCED 1, pupils aged 6-11) and lower secondary
schools (ISCED 2, pupils aged 11-14); the second one includes institutions with different
specializations and durations – upper secondary schools (with vocational, technical and
general tracks) and regional vocational training (ISCED 3, pupils aged 14 to 17/19).
11 These schools are mostly in a public State system: private schools account for 12.9% of
Italian pupils and 9.8% of foreign ones – mostly in pre-primary education.
12 Formally, the choice of schools at every level is free: school zoning exists, but mainly for
organizational reasons (public transport, coordination among schools…) with no binding
enrolment  scheme;  all  different  specializations  in  upper  secondary  schools  can  be
accessed, whatever the entry level.
 
Emerging criticalities
13 In the intersection of traditional (e.g. class and territorial divides), new problems and
institutional responses, it is possible to stress some governance weaknesses in the Italian
education system, to which we will return:
• an inconsistent governance structure (mainly hierarchical and bureaucratic), that results in
blurred school autonomy and in promoting just formally decentralization;
• a  decentralization  that  set  up  an  unclear  division  of  tasks  and  responsibilities  between
levels, further institutionalizing a traditionally strong territorial divide;
• an unreformed lower secondary tier, a weak point in the educational path;
• a challenge to the traditional integrative and comprehensive school model raised by the new
profiles of pupils and families.
14 “Universal” in its welfare aims, the Italian education system proved to be selective in
practice, with tracking effects and problems in granting equality and social mobility in a
“blocked society” where social  and regional  backgrounds are strong determinants  of
intergenerational inequalities (Ballarino, Checchi, 2006; Ballarino et al., 2009; Schizzerotto
et al., 2011). 
 
PIBs in the educational system
15 A growing number of PIBs is one of the challenges the Italian education system faced in
the last two decades. The number of non-Italian citizens in Italian schools grew from less
than 200,000 in 2001 to some 815,000 in 2014 (9.2% of all pupils), with a growing share of
those born in Italy (now more than 55%, see Santagati, Ongini, 2016). The largest groups
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(accounting for more than 50% of the total) have Romanian, Albanian, Moroccan and PRC
citizenship. This trend paralleled the increased of the immigrant population as a whole,
since in the same years foreign residents grew from 1,3 to 5 million.
16 School tracking is particularly relevant for PIBs: vocational education is attended by 19%
of Italian pupils and 37% of PIBs (ibid.). Tracking is matched with delayed school careers:
almost two thirds of PIBs experience delays in their regular attendance at the age of 15,
with  an  impressive  gap  in  the  hold  back  rate.  National  and  international  students’
assessment show also a gap in competences, matched with a high regional variation.
17 Notwithstanding a good production of national documents on intercultural education,
the policy on paper hardly find a way in the actual practice: localized differences are not
compensated, and school integration is basically related to regional, local if not school-
level priorities and investments.
18 A good example comes from a supposedly “anti-segregation” national rule issued in 2010,
defining a threshold of 30% PIBs per class. Poor grasp on local characteristics of migration
(differences among the PIBs, numbers already higher than the thresholds in many locales,
with no way to cut the share) and the implementation autonomy left at the local level
made the measure merely symbolic and inadequate to cope with emerging concentration
factors.
 
Subnational policies. The regional and municipal level
19 The territorial levels of government play a relevant role. We provide here a short account
of regional and local measures (in Lombardy/Milan; Emilia-Romagna/Bologna; Latium/
Rome; Campania/Naples), to disentangle the relationship between scales and practices in




20 It  is  not  easy  to  assess  social  expenditure  targeting  minors  from  an  immigrant
background: they access both dedicated (e.g. mediation) and mainstream measures (e.g.
free textbooks, scholarships, juvenile social service...), but there are rarely data on users.
21 The ISTAT survey on municipal social services includes the area “immigration and Roma
people”, that makes up a limited share of local social expenditure: in 2012, it ranged from
1.6% in Campania to 4.7% in Latium (where anyway it is largely used for the Roma people
target), passing for 2.1% in Lombardy and 3.4% in Emilia-Romagna. It means a per-capita
yearly expenditure of € 26 in Campania and Lombardy, € 52 in Emilia-Romagna and € 98
in Latium.
22 Expenditure has been decreasing in the years due to the negative effect of political debate
on the issue and the end of national earmarked transfers after the implementation of the
2001 Constitutional Reform (Napolitano, 2012).
23 Further information can be found in regional deliberations on budget, to understand how
much Regions steer their municipalities. Direct regional resources during the 2000s have
been quite  limited,  accounting  for  some 20-25% of  total  local  expenditure  (Kazepov,
Barberis, 2012).
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Policy priorities and institutionalization of measures
24 Integration (especially school integration) is an issue usually included in regional policy
priorities,  especially  in  Lombardy  and  Emilia-Romagna.  In  the  first  case,  regional
guidelines promote educational participation, and language policies (Gambino, 2005),
being minors and youth the most frequent target (cf. also Tosi et al., 2012). A dedicated
Regional  Observatory  and  a  big  player  from the  civil  society  (Ismu)  have  been  also
managing a database of projects for intercultural education and made frequent training
activities.
25 In  the  second  case  (Emilia-Romagna),  in  early  2000s  teaching  Italian  to  minors,
intercultural education and afterschool activites were the third most funded priority.
From the mid-2000s onward it became the biggest target, accounting for 1/3 of dedicated
social  expenditure  in  2006.  A  survey  pointed  out  that  education  was  the  area  most
covered by municipal policies for immigrants (Pavolini, 2006).
26 In Latium a large share of resources is dedicated to Roma, asylum-seekers and refugees,
so PIBs are not a priority target.  Many local authorities cope with them through the
access  to  mainstream  services  –  mainly  with  an  emergency  approach  (Marucci,
Montedoro, 2010).
27 In Campania, minors, education and intercultural measures have been the second most
endowed regional immigrant policy priority in the early 2000s (Ormel, 2004).
28 Though, in general, just Emilia-Romagna shows a certain degree of institutionalization in
programming and funding regularly this policy area and target (Campomori, Caponio,
2014).
 
Practices at local level: coping a case
29 Using the vignette technique, we tested main features of local immigrant policies and
how they affect educational access chances. Actually, we asked 40 social workers and civil
servants how they would cope the case of J., a 15 years-old newcomer with poor language
skills in Italian, whose family requested for school enrolment. This case is challenging
since J.  is at the limit of the compulsory education age in Italy, and interviewed civil
servants  have to  choose between a  “social”  and a  “selective” view of  education and
schooling.
30 In principle, our interviewees maintain that the right to education is binding, but we can
identify some problems due to the age of the pupil, especially if J. is undocumented: some
municipalities  apply  (unlawful)  exclusionary  measures  by  requiring  a  residence
certificate  to  access  services  –  a  certificate  that  by  definition  undocumented  people
cannot have. In some cases, there is a shrinkage of rights, partly due to the profiling of J.
as not particularly “deserving” (as adolescent, male and immigrant), partly due to a lack
of knowledge on relevant norms.
31 These problems add up to governance issues:  an integrated support network keeping
together  school  and  local  authorities  is  often  missing.  This  general  trend  can  vary
according  to  place-specific  characteristics.  Problems  are  less  tough  in  areas  where
immigration is less an issue in the policy debate; where politics support pro-immigrant
policies; where there are specific skills in the policy network of public and private actors.
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32 In Bologna, there is a centre for intercultural education collecting good practices and
coordinating  intercultural  mediation  in  schools.  Many  associations  and  cooperatives
provide complementary services. The weak point is the lack of clear and institutionalized
coping strategies, due to poor resources, skills and programming.
33 Milan showed a more hostile relationship between school and non-school actors, with a
negative politicization of the issue that ended only recently with a change in the local
government.  Some  interviewees  complain  for  a  residual  role  of  public  actors,  more
focussed on emergencies that on day-by-day criticality.
34 In Rome there is a strong delegation towards Third Sector organizations, sometimes very
experienced and effective. Measures provided by the municipality have been frequent
(e.g. dedicated service centres for schools), though with problems in the continuity of
funding.
35 In Naples, support chances are more limited: there were no targeted measures, but also
difficulties in accessing mainstream policies due to limited resources and social workers'
expertise.
 
Coping within a low standardization environment
36 After this assessment, we can rank our four cases according to the coping networks they
have and the guidance provided by public authorities (Table 1).  The most structured
network with a stronger public role is in Emilia-Romagna, while in Lombardy and Latium
civil society plays a stronger role – sometimes complementary, sometime substituting
public authorities. In Campania the role of public actors is the weakest, delegating to
NGOs.
37 Nevertheless it is worth noting that even most structured networks we analysed have a
low degree of institutionalization: more than 20 years after the first national guidelines
on  intercultural  education  and  PIBs,  coping  practices  are  still  voluntarist  and
extemporaneous, variable in time and space.
 
School segregation
38 As an example of a national system that “passes the buck” of integration problems to the
micro-local level, in this section we analyse school segregation processes at local level.
We maintain, as suggested above, that school segregation is shaped according to patterns
typical  of  systems with low institutional  regulation.  Data about pupil’s  enrolment by
nationality (Italian / foreign) in any single school came from the Minister of Education.
To measure segregation, we used Theil's h-index, taken as a proxy of uneven distribution,
which ranges from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (complete segregation). The index, originally
presented by Theil (1972), is also known as the multigroup information index and must be
interpreted as the weighted average of the difference between the whole diversity and
the specific diversity of a single area. It is well-known in literature that there is large
correlation between H index and the classic Dissimilarity index based on the Lorenz curve
(Duncan and Duncan,  1995),  which rather  measures  evenness  through another  of  its
dimension:  concentration.  We  choose  H  index  because  it  is  less  sensitive  to  the
measurement  of  small  groups3 and  allows  to  decompose  segregation  at  different
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territorial levels (see Figure 1),  consistently with our interest for scales.  We analysed
components according to the example by Reardon et al. (2000). 
39 The H index has been divided into 4 components (see Figure 1), measuring segregation: 
• between  schools  in  the  metropolitan  area  and  in  the  core  municipality  (Hcm),  whose
boundaries have been marked with a thick line in Figure 2; 
• among schools in different districts within the core municipality (Hc); 
• among schools in different districts outside the core municipality (Hm); 
• among different schools within individual school districts (Hw).
 
Components of segregation
40 The  metropolitan  areas  we  analysed  show  the  importance  of  city centres  for  job
opportunities and services, but also the relevant role played by surrounding residential
belts in accommodating migrants. Nevertheless these areas are not showing strong ethnic
segregation patterns. This settlement pattern also means that long-staying immigrant
households with children are located in neighbourhoods where the availability of school
facilities does not equate to the growth of school-age residents.
41 To demonstrate this process, we will focus on lower secondary schools.4 They are a weak
point in the Italian educational system for two reasons. Firstly, as part of comprehensive,
general and compulsory education, they are meant to be evenly distributed at local level
and thus attended by nearby residents,5 but they are actually unevenly distributed, since
institutional change (opening or closing schools) is slower than social change (settlement
patterns of new inhabitants).
42 Secondly, they are selective both in their organization by subjects and in their actual
effects (this is the level at which the gap by class, origin and area opens dramatically),
thus showing more segregation than primary schools (Mussino, Strozza, 2012; De Simone,
2013).
43 The analysis will focus on datasets from the school years 2003/04 and 2010/11 provided
by the Statistical Service of the Ministry of Education, University and Research6. In this
time span, foreign pupils more than doubled in the four case studies (see Table 1).
44 The dataset includes the whole population of enrolled pupils by school, citizenship and
city. The administrative label used to identify PIBs is “non-Italian citizens”: this means
that  we  cannot  provide  data  on  PIBs  with  Italian  citizenship  (i.e.  with  a  native  or
naturalized  Italian  parent).  Given  that  Italy-born  children  with  foreign  parents  can
naturalize just when 18, and naturalization rates were still low in the years we focussed
on. Estimations on Census data show that the under-representation of PIBs should range
between 4 and 8% (that is, less than 1% of the total number of pupils). 
45 The growth of foreign pupils did not affect their segregation level, with a quite limited h-
index compared to European and US cases (Kristen, 2008; Oberti, 2007; SCP, 2009; Alegre,
Ferrer-Esteban, 2010). Nevertheless, the situation has not been static at all: the territorial
components  of  the h-index show differences  among the four cities  in a)  segregation
models; b) patterns of change (Table 1 and Figure 1).
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Table 1. Context data, school population data (lower secondary schools only) and school
segregation (H index) in selected provinces.
Source: data on foreign residents from demo.istat.it; unemployment data from
dati.istat.it; scores on policies based on analysis included in the previous section; data
on schools and segregation, own elaboration on data from the Ministry of Education
 
Figure 1. School segregation index (H), components – school years 2003/2004 and 2010/2011.
Hw = segregation within individual districts; Hm = segregation among districts outside the
core municipality; Hc = segregation among districts in the core municipality; Hcm =
segregation between core municipality and metropolitan area
Source: elaboration on data from the Ministry of Education, University and Research
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46 We can see four different concentration models. Bologna has a more “balanced” (and
lower) school segregation. Foreign pupils' concentration is due to their settlement in
some urban working class areas and in some districts of the metropolitan belt (the ones
mixing residential  and productive functions).  All  in all,  the segregation between and
within districts is limited. Segregation between the core municipality and the rest of the
metropolitan  area  increases  due  to  the  doubling  of  PIBs  and  the  stability  of  Italian
citizens pupils. Mapping the data, we can see a high concentration of PIBs in large schools
in  the  north-western part  of  the  city  (Figure  2).  Family  reunifications  increased the
concentration  in  the  core  municipality,  where  you  find  most  of  long-lasting  settled
immigrant households (Comune Di Bologna, INFO-BO, 2012).
 
Figure 2. Share of national pupils and PIBs by school size. School year 2010/2011.
Source: our elaboration on data from the Ministry of Education, University and Research
47 In the wider metropolitan area, schools with higher shares of foreign pupils are in the
north-western  belt,  a  multi-specialized  agro-industry  area.  This  means  also  that  the
matching of productive and housing sprawl somehow contributes to limiting segregation
via territorial dispersal.
48 In  Milan,  the most  specific  segregation dimension has  to  be  found in the difference
between the  core  municipality  and the  surrounding  belt.  This  has  no  connection to
residential patterns, but is instead due to the higher attractiveness, for Italian native
pupils, of schools in the core city. However, within the core city there is a difference
between centre and periphery, with possible evidence of a white flight from the latter
(Ranci  et  al.,  2016).  Also,  comparing  data  from 2003/04  and  2010/11,  schools  in  the
northern belt are becoming increasingly similar to those in the core city – contributing to
some sort of de-concentration effect.
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49 On a lower scale, de-concentration also took place in Naples, where anyway the number
of foreign pupils grew in just a few districts. Segregation here is mainly due to differences
between districts in the urban belt: no school has more than 30% of foreign pupils and
few (small) schools have a relevant share of PIBs.
50 Lastly, in Rome pupils living in the urban belt enrol in the urban belt, and those living in
the core city enrol in the core city, and the most relevant component is the micro one,
within every district. Every district in Rome has at least a fairly big school with a high
share of PIBs (close to 25%) and a small school with a share close to zero. At least six
districts have schools with a very high share of PIBs. This is the case where the lack of an
adequate governance of educational institutions is clearer, since school segregation is not
so related with residential segregation. 
51 In  the  urban  belt,  we  can  see  two  types  of  concentration  areas:  a)  municipalities
traditionally  attracting  populations  coming  from  central  Rome  in  suburbanization
processes; b) rural depopulating towns, where the high share of PIBs is due to the sharp
decrease of Italian nationals. 
 
Segregation scales and accessibility in education
52 In general, the micro-dimension of school segregation seems to be the most important
feature in most of our case studies. This issue requires a clarification on the Italian model
of school segregation. Concentration can be due to a variable mix of factors: 
• Residential (micro-)segregation pushing migrants in specific urban traits;
• White flight and sorting mechanisms (Ball et al., 1996), i.e. a quasi-market competition for
scarce places in more attractive schools;
• Negative by-products of school policies;
• Problems  in  producing  policies  and  measures  for  school  integration:  shortcomings  in
planning  and  managing  complex  and  intermingled  policies  (education,  labour  market,
housing, migration) – which should probably be coped at a higher scale.
53 To disentangle such a mix of factors, we will analyse small-scale examples that epitomize
the  local  outcome of  the  rescaling  and subsidiarization of  policies.  We will  consider
possible effects of individual choices, ethnic composition of districts and school offers. In
particular, we focus here the role played by private schools: even if limited in the Italian
context as mentioned above, they can be used as a proxy of individual choices (basically,
the choice to leave the much prevalent public education).
54 In Milan, private schools have very few foreign pupils. This means an overburdening for
nearby state schools – as in the north-eastern semi-periphery. Elusive and discriminatory
strategies seem limited to the city centre, where the share of PIBs is limited. 
55 In Bologna, private schools are not accessible to PIBs, and closeness to residence is the
main factor that influences concentration. In some neighbourhoods, this leads to a quite
extraordinary level of PIBs concentration, that also cumulates with other disadvantaged
conditions for the local residents as a whole.
56 In Rome the situation is slightly different: many small, private religious schools include
foreign pupils in different districts of the city. However, in Rome it is also common to see
unbalances between schools in the same neighbourhood, likely due to parental elusive
strategies. For example, in a north-western semi-central middle-class area there are two
state schools, but PIBs are enrolled in only one, considered as the least exclusive. On the
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other hand, in the Esquilino district – a strongly multi-ethnic area in the city centre –
PIBs concentration in a single school is explained by that school’s long-standing attention
to PIBs integration policies. Although there are two other state schools within 800 metres,
one  school  is  attracting  most  PIBs,  for  it  is  also  a  service  centre  for  intercultural
education.
57 Lastly,  Naples  seems  to  reproduce  same  features  analysed  in  the  other  three  cities,
though at a lower level, due to the limited number of foreign pupils.
 
Conclusions
58 The analyses above – and the context and summary data in Table 1 above – show that
segregation effects  are strongly based on localized (and sometimes even micro-local)
processes intersecting settlement trends and (weak) policy arrangements.  In a poorly
regulated national context,  the governance of migration – that we analysed from the
specific  point of  view of  the school  participation of  PIBs – is  strongly related to the
“spontaneous” interplay between labour and housing markets.
59 We could not find a clear-cut component to map school segregation. The distribution of
PIBs  follows  settlement  patterns  based  on  specific  local  sources  of  attractiveness:
affordable housing and labour market opportunities in Bologna are more scattered then
elsewhere and contribute to a lower segregation, while local authorities may also benefit
from a more effective local integration policy. Higher inequality in housing and labour
market in service-based economies account for a higher segregation, especially in specific
peripheral blocks.
60 The  increasing  number  of  pupils  enrolled  in  the  metropolitan  belt  requires  the
educational  offer  to  be  adequately  set  at  least  at  metropolitan  level,  to  avoid  PIBs
concentrations due to the scarcity of schools or the poorness of integration policies. So,
part of the problem is due to unequal distribution of measures (as the Roman case shows)
or  to  an  inadequate  planning  of  school  offer  in  new  residential  areas  –  especially
vulnerable ones.
61 As mentioned above, school segregation is still lower than in other Western countries,
likely due to the comprehensive educational system and a limited residential segregation
– a positive but not planned effect. Nevertheless, there is still much to study about micro-
segregation  within  neighbourhoods.  Sometimes  it  is  due  to  residential  micro-
concentrations, in other cases due to filtering-out processes and white flights. 
62 With a weak national attention to immigrant policy, problems are mostly dumped on
single  schools,  making national  goals  hard to  achieve without  adequate  support  and
shared practices. An ideal-type comprehensive educational system is on the ropes in a
retrenchment era that jeopardizes the agency of  school  institutions,  which are given
responsibilities but limited resources, skills and governance networks to deal with them.
63 The  management  of  vulnerable  conditions  (including  migrant  one)  is  not  framed
adequately in national policies, and this puts a high pressure on local policy networks,
since schools do not have “in-house” professionals to face new challenges.
64 This is consistent with some well-known factors in the Italian welfare (Kazepov, 2010).
Firstly,  the  problem of  territorial  fragmentation:  the  differences  in  the  provision  of
services, infrastructures and resources do not reflect only a North/South divide (even
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though  important, as  Table  1  shows)  but  also  a  micro-dimension,  that  turns  into  a
“postcode lottery” (living and studying in a city or neighbourhood means accessing very
different basic provisions).
65 Secondly,  the  issue  of  coordination.  School  autonomy  and  decades  of  devolution
redistributed responsibility, though with a lack of resources, thus paving the way for a
“decentralization of penury” (Kazepov, 2010; Mény, Wright, 1985). Local resources and
policy networks are unevenly endowed and may lack tools for an effective coping of
emerging problems – including segregation. In this respect, school and local autonomy
can turn into an inadequate tool  for  PIBs’  integration,  if  not  properly matched with
institutional  empowerment,  capacitation  tools,  and  resources  to  cope  with  devolved
tasks.
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NOTES
1. We define  PIBs  as  the  children of  a  parent  born abroad,  whatever  their  citizenship.  This
definition has been used for interviews, while data collection in the section "school segregation"
– as reported below – is based on available citizenship data.
2. For  a  description  of  the  Italian  education  system,  see  Eurydice  page:  https://
webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Italy:Overview. 
3. Actually, the measure of diversity is not based on a simple proportion of the foreign group, but
on the proportion multiplied by the natural logarithm of its reverse.
4. In the Italian educational system, they are attended by pupils aged 11-13. 
5. Which  is  different  from  upper  secondary  schools,  whose  specialist  subject  tracks  are
considered a more important factor in choosing a school than their location.
6. Number of pupils and schools analysed are reported in Table 1. Italian and foreign pupils per
school and localization have been studied. There are no missing data. Though, potential sources
of  distorsion  come  from  definitions  used  by  the  Ministry:  (a)  there  is  no  information  on
naturalized  PIBs;  (b)  few school  branches  (2-4% per  city)  have  no  individual  identifier.  It  is
therefore impossible to geo-reference their location and pupils. Their data is thus counted under
their reference school.
ABSTRACTS
This article is aimed to analyse processes of school segregation in four Italian metropolitan areas
(Milan, Bologna, Rome, Naples), considering their linkages with the transformation of settlement
trends and national and local immigration policies.
In this respect, rescaling processes imply an increased scope for an uncoordinated local action,
affecting  –  among  the  other  issues  – how  migrants  settle  and  meet  relevant  institutions,
including schools.
After introducing the different hub role of the four metropolitan areas for international migrants
to  Italy,  school  segregation  will  be  analysed  as  an  effect  resulting  from the  interrelation of
settlement patterns and institutional configurations. Examples of micro-segregation processes in
every city will be used to disentangle the relation between scalar processes and localized agency.
Cet  article  a  pour  objet  l'analyse  des  processus  de  ségrégation  scolaire  dans  quatre  régions
métropolitaines  italiennes  (Milan,  Bologne,  Rome,  Naples)  sur  base  de  leur  rapport  avec
l'évolution des tendances d'établissement des immigrés et les politiques locales d'immigration.
Dans  ce  contexte,  les  mécanismes  de  changement  d'échelle  impliquent  des  actions  non-
coordonnées au niveau local,  qui  concernent entre autres l'installation des migrants et  leurs
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contacts avec les institutions, notamment avec les écoles.
Après  avoir  présenté  les  différentes  fonctions  de  pôles  de  convergence nous analysons  la
ségrégation scolaire en tant que résultat de l'interrelation entre les schémas d'établissement et
les configurations institutionnelles. Plusieurs exemples de processus de micro-ségrégation dans
chacune  des  villes  mettront  en  lumière  la  relation  entre  processus  scolaires  et  institutions
locales.
INDEX
Mots-clés: ségrégation scolaire, échelle territoriale, marché du travail local, politiques de
l'éducation, régions italiennes
Keywords: school segregation, rescaling, local labour market, educational policy, Italian regions
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